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Abstract
What is the impact of import competition from low-wage countries (LWCs)
on inationary pressure in Europe? This paper examines whether labor-
intensive exports from emerging Europe, Asia, and other global regions have
a uniform impact on producer prices in Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. In a panel covering 110 (4-digit) NACE industries
from 1995 to 2008, instrumental variable estimations predict that LWC im-
port competition is associated with strong price eects. More specically,
when LWC exporters capture 1% of European market share, producer prices
decrease by about 3%. In contrast, no eect is present for import competi-
tion from low-wage countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Decomposing
the mechanisms that underlie the LWC price eect on European industry, we
show that import competition has a pronounced eect on average productiv-
ity with only a muted eect on wages or margins. Owing to the exit of rms
and the increase in productivity, LWC import competition is shown to have
substantially reduced employment in the European manufacturing sector.
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Bank.1. Introduction
Trade's impact with low-wage countries (LWCs) { and in particular with
China { on industry structure and prices in developed economies is a con-
tentious issue.1 Numerous researchers have attempted to determine whether
imports from China held down European prices.2 A common nding is that
trade with LWCs had only a mild eect at best on European prices. The
objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the impact of LWC exports
on European producer prices is much more pronounced and complex than is
commonly assumed.
We argue that the existing literature fails to establish the causal eect
1See Mishkin (2007), Carney (2008), De Gregorio (2008), and Trichet (2008) for di-
verging views as to how central bank governors dene the links between globalization and
ination.
2Micro studies using 2- and 4-digit PPI and CPI data include Bugamelli et al. (2010)
for Italy (small price eect), Glatzer et al. (2006) for Austria (no price eect), WEO
(2006) for Europe (no price eect), and Wheeler (2008) for the UK (no price eect). Borio
and Filardo, (2007) and Pain et al. (2006) use conventional specications of Phillips curves
to determine the role of foreign output gaps on (aggregate) domestic ination. A separate
set of empirical studies including Auer and Fischer (2010), Ball (2006), Gamber and Hung
(2001), Ihrig et al. (2007), Kamin et al. (2006), and Tootell (1998) focus exclusively on
the U.S. case.
1of trade since trade ows are endogenous to local demand conditions. For
example, when an industrial sector in Europe experiences a positive demand
shock, prices increase, thereby inducing an increase in LWC imports. The
presence of this endogeneity biases the estimated relative price eect from
trade towards a less negative or even positive correlaton between import
growth and European price changes.
The paper's rst contribution is to extend the IV strategy of Auer and Fis-
cher (2010) for the case of both heterogeneous exporter markets (i.e. emerg-
ing Europe versus China) and heterogeneous import markets (i.e., Germany,
France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). As in Auer and Fischer
(2010), the IV strategy is based on the observation that when LWC manu-
facturing output grows, LWC exports to Europe increase in labor intensive
sectors relative to capital intensive sectors. Imports from LWCs are heav-
ily concentrated in labor intensive industries. Regression analysis shows that
this specialization also holds at the margin: for example, when China's manu-
facturing output rises, Chinese exports increase much more in labor-intensive
sectors than in capital intensive sectors.
Because the aggregate growth of productive capacity in LWCs may be
endogenous to European demand, a dierence-in-dierence specication is
2used to identify the causal eect of LWC imports on prices. Fixed eects are
also introduced to lter out sector specic trends in prices. The variation
that is exploited relates the dierence in how imports change in sectors with
dierent labor intensities to dierences in sectoral price changes. In addition
to this identication strategy, we also determine how the latter supply-driven
increase in imports aects various import markets dierentially given their
varying degree of openness to China and the other LWCs covered in this
study.
Beyond the empirical nding that LWC trade has a profound relative price
impact on European producer prices, we show that this result is largely driven
by Chinese exports. More specically, when Chinese exporters capture 1% of
European market share, producer prices decrease about 2%. In contrast, no
eect is present for import competition from low-wage countries in Central
and Eastern European (CEE).
The paper's second contribution is to decompose the channels of the LWC
price eect, thereby highlighting how LWC import competition has shaped
the evolution of European industry during the last decade. Such import
competition is shown to have had only a small eect on the relative wages of
production workers, no eect on rm's margins, but a large eect on average
3rm productivity. Additional evidence shows that the productivity eect
is driven by the exit of unproductive rms, which is consistent with Melitz
(2003).
LWC import competition is also shown to have signicantly reduced em-
ployment in the manufacturing sector. Our estimates suggest that between
1995 and 2007, the increase in LWC import competition may have reduced
employment in the manufacturing sector in Germany, Italy, France, Sweden,
and the UK in the order of 10% (or by about 1.3 million workers in the
sectors covered in our study).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 rst discusses the empirical
framework and the data in the context of LWC exports. Next, section 3
presents OLS and IV estimates of LWC's impact on European producer
prices. Thereafter, Section 4 disentangles the main empirical result of section
3 by considering dierent regional constellations of LWC import competition.
These include examining the role of China separately or alternatively the in-
uence of CEE countries with an abundance of low-skilled labor. Section 5
decomposes the LWC price eect into the contributions of wages, markups,
and productivity. Section 6 oers concluding remarks on the global nature
of labor-intensive goods and their implications for European prices.
42. Empirical framework and data
The discussion of the empirical framework is presented in three subsections.
The regression model and the IV strategy are discussed in subsection 2.1.
Instrument construction and preliminary rst-stage regressions are presented
in subsection 2.2. Data description and sources are oered in subsection 2.3.
2.1 Empirical setup
The true relation between European price changes and LWC import changes
is given by
pe;j;t = p;j + mlwc;j;t + p;t + p;j;t; (1)
where pe;j;t denotes European prices at time t for sector j and mlwc;j;t denotes
European imports in sector j from LWCs. The industry-specic trend of Eu-
ropean prices in sector j is captured by p;j, the common shock to European
prices at time t by p;t, and sector specic price shocks by p;j;t. The absolute
change in a variable is denoted by .
In equation 1, the coecient of interest, , measures the true impact of
an increase in trade with LWCs on European sectoral prices. A prior shared
by most researchers is that LWC imports lead to lower European prices, i.e.,
 < 0.
5It is evident that trade is endogenous to local demand conditions in equa-
tion 1. OLS estimation of  in equation 1 is therefore biased. Apart from
the unobserved export supply shocks in LWCs (denoted by slwc;j;t below),
European prices also inuence how much foreign rms export. The rela-
tion between the change in LWC imports, European prices, and supply and
demand conditions in LWCs is given by
mlwc;j;t = m;j + pe;j;t + slwc;j;t + m;t + m;j;t; (2)
where m;j is an industry-specic trend of LWC imports, m;t is a common
shock to LWC exports to Europe, and m;j;t is a sector-specic shock.
To solve the endogeneity problem, we observe in the next subsection that
LWC exports to Europe are primarily in labor-intensive sectors and that the
increase in exports is larger when aggregate LWC growth is high. We denote
the LWC growth of manufacturing output by glwc and a sector's (average)
labor intensity by: lsj. For most specications presented below, we postulate
that supply pressure in LWCs follows
sm;j;t = s;j + 1glwc;t + 2glwc;tlsj + s;t + s;j;t; (3)
where s;t and s;j;t are aggregate and sector-specic shocks.
Because aggregate growth in LWCs may still be correlated with aggregate
6demand in Europe, we do not use sm;j;t as an instrument for trade. Rather,
we evaluate the dierence of imports between two sectors j and k that dier
in their labor intensities lsj and lsk, yielding
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((p;j   p;k) +  (m;j   m;k) +  (s;j   s;k)):
In subsection 4.3, where we analyze the impact of import competition
from CEE countries on European prices, we rene our instrumentation strat-
egy to incorporate the fact that the CEE exporters may be more or less im-
portant in certain European markets in certain types of goods. For example,
7owing to the geographic proximity, these countries could be more important
in Germany than in France for goods with high transportation costs. We thus
weigh the instrument proposed in equation 3 by the lagged import share of
the CEE exporters in each European importer (denoted by mlwc;j;i;t 1 where
i is the importing nation), yielding
g sm;j;t =

s;j + 1glwc;t + 2glwc;tlsj + s;t + s;j;t

mlwc;j;t 1: (6)
For both measures of LWC supply pressure in equations 3 and 6, the
methodology can establish the true eect of LWC imports if the following
condition holds.
Assumption 1. (Identication Restriction)
(p;j;t   p;k;t) ? glwc;t(lsj   lsk):
Assumption 1 requires that aggregate growth in LWCs is not the result of
sector specic European demand shocks, which are systematically biased to-
wards high or low labor-intensive sectors. Assumption 1 says that aggregate
growth in LWCs has no direct eect on the dierence in price changes be-
tween European sectors j and k other than its true impact on imports from
LWCs. The orthogonality assumption does not impose that aggregate growth
in LWCs is orthogonal to European demand shocks that are canceled out due
8to the dierence-in-dierence formulation.
Because lsj   lsk is a constant over time, the orthogonality assumption
assumes that growth in LWCs is not the result of sector specic European
demand shocks that are concentrated in labor intensive sectors. The orthog-
onality assumption fails only if all of the following three conditions hold. In
Europe, there is a systematic shift of demand towards labor intensive goods
(for constant prices of these goods). The demand shift induces imports from
LWCs. Aggregate growth in LWCs is caused by an increase in European
demand.3
2.2 The construction of the instrument
The IV strategy is based on the simple observation that when LWC manu-
facturing output grows, their exports to Europe increase in labor intensive
sectors relative to capital intensive sectors.4 Figure 1 plots average labor in-
3Auer and Fischer (2010) use information on U.S. consumption growth, U.S. non-LWC
import demand, and U.S. production to test the orthogonality assumption, nding no
evidence for this to be the case. Furthermore, even if Assumption 1 were partly violated,
our results still provide a valid lower bound on the impact that imports of LWCs have on
European prices: any bias that is left would tend to an underestimation of the eect of
LWC imports.
4The strategy is motivated by Heckscher-Ohlin theory and its modern extensions by
Treer (1993), Davis and Weinstein (2001), and Romalis (2004). The classical theory of
9tensity for European industry weighted by Chinese import share, LWCs, and
World from 1995 to 2008. The six LWC countries are China, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand. These countries are dened to be low
wage, because they have a high level of manufacturing exports and a GDP
per capita of less than 25% of the European average.5 Europe is Germany,
France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The graph highlights two
stylized facts that are crucial for the IV strategy. First, average labor inten-
sity irrespective of origin is stable over the 14-year period. LWC exports to
Europe are 20% more labor intensive than exports from the rest of the world.
To analyze how import competition from China and other LWCs has
changed over time, Figure 2 shows two scatter plots relating low-wage import
competition to labor intensity for two points in time. The upper scatter plot
relates the volume of European imports from the six LWCs normalized by
European sales in 1996 to the sector's labor intensity. In 1996, imports were
concentrated in labor-intensive industries. The lower scatter plot documents
trade predicts that countries should specialize in industries that intensively use relatively
abundant factors.
5Using the same denition, Auer and Fischer (2010) dene the following countries to
be low wage for U.S. imports: China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. See the Appendix as to how the LWCs are selected.
10that this relationship is even more pronounced in 2008. In terms of their
changes, the two scatter plots of Figure 2 also imply that the increase in
import competition was concentrated in labor-intensive sectors.
Based on the documented observations from Figures 1 and 2, the instru-
ment is constructed the following way. We rst generate one weight for each
LWC country i by averaging (imports from country i /(European domestic
shipments + total imports)) over (a maximum of) 110 sectors and over the
full sample. We then construct the weighted growth of manufacturing output
in the six LWCs by summing over the growth rate multiplied by the country
weight. Finally, we multiply the weighted growth rate by the European labor
intensity of sector j.
Table 1 documents the empirical motivation for the instrument. In each
regression, the dependent variable is European import share for a selected
country. Columns 1 to 3 serve to highlight our empirical strategy. In these
specications, the dependent variable is the percentage point change in im-
ports from China divided by the size of the respective sector in Europe. The
size of a sector is dened as the value of domestic shipments plus the values
of imports from all countries.
We rst estimate a random-eects panel model in column 1. The import
11share of goods imported from China is regressed on the cross product between
the sector's labor share and aggregate growth of industrial production in
China (gchinalsj). We also include the two interacted components separately.
Column 1 documents that when industrial output in China expands, exports
to Europe grow stronger in labor intensive sectors and grow less rapidly in
capital intensive sectors. The estimated coecient for gChinalsj is +0:006
and is highly signicant. In other words, when China's industrial capacity
grows, exports to Europe increase more in labor intensive sectors than in
capital intensive sectors. Furthermore, the main eect of industrial growth
is estimated to be 0:012. That is, if the annual growth of Chinese industrial
output is 1%, the value of exports in an industry using only capital (lsj = 0)
increases by 0:012  0:01, or 0:012 percentage points.
To better understand the coecients in column 1, consider the following
exercise. In the sample covering 110 manufacturing industries, the 25th per-
centile of labor intensity equals about 2.5, while the 75th percentile is equal
to about 7.5. Assuming that the growth rate of Chinese industrial output is
10%, the value of European imports in industry k with labor intensity equal
to 2.5 increases by (0:006  2:5 + 0:012)  0:1 = 0:27 percentage points. In
contrast, European imports in the more labor intensive industry j with labor
12intensity equal to 7.5 increase by (0:006  7:5 + 0:012)  0:1 = 0:57 percent-
age points. This implies that import competition from China will grow by
around 0.3 percentage points more in sector j than in sector k.
Column 2 presents the same regression as in column 1, using xed-eects
estimation. Because the labor share is averaged over time and does therefore
not vary within a sector, it is dropped from the estimation. The results are
nearly identical to those of column 1. Next, in column 3, we also add time
dummies to the estimation. Because the growth of Chinese industrial pro-
duction is an aggregate variable, this regressor is dropped from the estimation
when time dummies are introduced.
Column 3 documents that the previous results are not driven by aggregate
trends (ltered with time dummies) or dierences in sector specic trends
(ltered with xed eects). Rather, the interaction coecient for the growth
of Chinese output multiplied by the sector's labor intensity captures the
dierent responses that imports from sectors with dierent labor intensities
display when China's industrial output increases.
Columns 4 to 6 repeat the same exercise with yearly and sectoral dum-
mies for dierent LWC blocks: LWC-6 (i.e., China, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
the Philippines, and Thailand), LWC-4 (LWC-6 minus China and Mexico),
13LWC-10 (LWC-6 plus CEE) and low-wage CEE countries (Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, and Turkey).6 The coecients for the measure of supply driven
pressures are positive and signicant.
We interpret the information from Table 1 as follows: there is a systematic
relation between changes in European imports that can only be rationalized
by explanations of comparative advantage. When labor abundant LWCs
grow, their exports increase much more in labor intensive sectors than in
capital intensive sectors. To further corroborate this view, we demonstrate
the importance of labor abundance in the construction of the instrument in
columns 8 and 9. In these regressions, we instrument for LWC trade with
LWC growth interacted with a measure of skill intensity. The measure for
skill intensity is constructed as one minus the share of non research and
development workers multiplied by labor intensity.7 This measure fails to
predict imports from China (column 8) and LWC-10 (column 9).
2.3 Data description
6Again, the selection criteria for the (low-wage) CEE countries are discussed in the
Appendix.
7Auer and Fischer (2010) conduct a similar exercise for Chinese exports to the United
States, using skill intensity as an interaction term rather than the share of non research
and development workers.
14We use annual trade data from Eurostat from 1995 to 2008. The classication
of import data is 4-digit NACE for a maximum of 110 industrial sectors.8
Europe is comprised by France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. The selection of these countries is based on data availability at
the 4-digit level. European data on wages, producer prices, and productivity
at the 4-digit level are also from Eurostat.
The measure of import penetration is constructed in the following man-
ner. Consider for example the LWC-6 measure. We divide the value of total
imports from the six LWCs (i.e., China, India, Malaysia Mexico, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand) by the value of domestic shipments plus world imports.
To make sure that the results are not driven by the endogenous response of
European sales to European price developments, the value of domestic ship-
ments plus world imports is averaged over the full sample. Our measure of
import penetration takes the value of 0.01 in a sector where imports from
8The Statistical Classication of Economic Activities in the European Community (in
French: nomenclature statistique des activities economiques dans la Communiaute eu-
ropeenne), commonly referred to as NACE, is a European industry standard classication
system consisting of a 6-digit code. The rst four digits are the same for all European
countries, whereas the fth varies from country to country and further digits are placed
by database suppliers.
15LWC-6 amount to 1% of average European sales in the respective sector.
When examining changes of import penetration, we evaluate the absolute
change in the level of import penetration, i.e., import penetration at time
t minus import penetration at t-1. This strategy is expedient, because the
response of European prices should be in relation to the increase of imports
in proportion to European demand but not in proportion to the percentage
growth of imports from LWCs. Further, normalizing by sector size in Europe
does not drop any zero-trade observations.
To measure an industry's labor intensity, the 1995 to 2008 average of the
European labor expenditure share is used for each of the 110 sectors. Labor
intensity is dened as the ratio of average labor expenditure divided by the
average capital expenditure.
3. LWC imports and European prices
This section presents OLS and two-stage least squares estimates for the
dierence-in-dierence specication of equation 5. All estimates for Euro-
pean and eurozone prices are stacked regressions that include country dum-
mies. We begin our discussion by rst presenting OLS estimates of European
producer prices on LWC import share. This exercise is done to highlight the
16bias in OLS estimation.
Panel C of Table 2 shows OLS regressions that do not support the con-
jecture that growing LWC imports are associated with declining European
prices. The dependent variable is the percentage change of the European
producer price index for each 4-digit sector. Table 2 presents results us-
ing xed-eects panel regressions. The regression in column 1 includes time
dummies. In this specication, European prices fall by -0.06% to a 1% above
trend rise in LWC import share. Next, we add LWC output to the speci-
cation. Column 2 shows that the coecient on import share collapses to
0.001 and is insignicant. A further step is to introduce wages and produc-
tivity. The coecient of interest in this regression, shown in column 3, is
0.015 and remains insignicant. Next, column 4 replicates the regression of
column 1 for the three eurozone countries (i.e., France, Germany, and Italy).
The coecient on import share now is  0:029 but is still insignicant. As a
last check, dierent dynamic aspects of prices are considered. In column 5,
the introduction of lagged producer prices does not alter the insignicance
of import share. The same is true when lagged import share is introduced in
the specication. Again, column 6 shows that the import share coecient is
negative but insignicantly so.
17The IV regressions as opposed to the OLS regressions show that LWC
exports generate a large relative price eect. European producer prices fall
between 3.2% and 4.8% when LWC growth in manufacturing rises by 1%
above trend. The LWC eect on European prices is statistically signicant
at the 1% level for all specications.
We begin the discussion of the IV results with the rst-stage regressions.
These regressions are displayed in Panel A of Table 2. In each specication,
the instrument passes several tests of weak identication. The Cragg-Donald
statistics, the associated Stock-Yogo statistic, as well as the F-statistic from
the rst-stage regressions reveal that the criticism of weak instruments is
not an issue. The same panel also shows that the variable of interest, labor
intensity multiplied by the change in LWC industrial output, is signicant
at the 1% level.
The second-stage IV regressions show that the relative price eect is sta-
ble in dierent specications. These are presented in Panel B. Column 1
shows that the relative price eect is -3.5 and highly signicant in the base-
line regression with time dummies. This point estimate means that a 1%
increase in LWC import share is associated with a 3.5% fall in European
producer prices. The addition of manufacturing output to the baseline re-
18gression shown in column 2 does not change the -3.5 estimate. The next
regression in column 3 adds sectoral productivity and wages to the speci-
cation. Although these variables may be endogenous to LWC import share,
the coecient on LWC import share jumps to -4.8%. This increase in the
estimated coecient is possibly explained by the restricted sample (7010 ob-
servations in column 1 versus 5620 observations in column 3). Next, the
eurozone regression presented in column 4 shows a slightly lower price ef-
fect at -3.2. The last two specications in columns 5 and 6 that control for
dynamics do not alter the baseline estimate.
When we observe that the market share of LWC imports grows, this could
stem from either more goods being imported at constant prices (the channel
we want to isolate), or alternatively, the same quantity being imported at
higher prices. To make sure that we study the rst eect, a rst robustness
test uses physical import volumes (measured in kilos) in the rst-stage re-
gressions instead of import values (measured in euros). Also the measure of
physical import volumes is normalized by the size of the market, which is
measured in the same physical quantity as is the import volume. Estimates
for European prices and their corresponding specications as in Table 2 are
shown in Table 3. In terms of the instrument's strength, the rst-stage re-
19gressions show higher F-tests than the regressions with import values. The
relative price eect remains highly signicant but is now estimated to be
around -2% for Europe and -1.5% for the eurozone.
4. LWC import competition from Asia and Emerging
Europe: Disentangling the Price Eect
In this section, we show that the IV strategy can be used in a bilateral setting
to answer the question whether Chinese exports lower European producer
prices. As a further step, we focus on how diuse LWC import competition
is in Europe and examine which European regions are inuenced the most.
As a last step, we focus on the group of low-wage countries located in CEE.
4.1 How large is the China eect for Europe?
The China question for Europe is of interest because the European Commis-
sion currently denes China to be the single most important challenge for EU
trade policy. China is the EU's biggest source of imports. More importantly,
the results for the bilateral setting show that the Chinese-American debate
on ination discussed in Auer and Fischer (2010) extends to the European
continent.
To highlight the instrument's strength in a bilateral setting, we re-run
20the regressions for LWCs in Tables 2 and 3 but now separately for China.
Table 4 presents OLS and IV estimates of Chinese import share on European
producer prices. The OLS results show that the coecient for the change
in import value (measured in euros) is negative and signicant for dierent
specications. Column 1 of Panel C shows a signicant coecient of -0.09 in
the panel regressions with annual dummies. Column 2 shows the regression
that adds Chinese manufacturing. The coecient on import share now falls
to -0.032 and is insignicant. Further, column 3 shows an extended regression
that includes productivity and wages. The coecient of interest falls further
to -0.016 and is signicant only at the 10% level. Next, column 4 replicates
the estimates for column 1 for the major eurozone countries: France, Ger-
many, and Italy. Here, the results are similar to those for column 1 with the
ve European countries. The last two specications in columns 5 and 6 con-
sider dierent dynamics of the specication in column 1. The introduction of
lagged producer prices or lagged import share mitigates slightly the estimate
for Chinese import share from -0.09 (column 1) to -0.07.
Next, IV estimates show that the price eect is much larger than the OLS
estimates suggest. The IV estimates are recorded in Panel B and the accom-
panying rst-stage regressions for the instrument equation are presented in
21Panel A. Depending on the specication, the highly signicant coecient on
Chinese import share lies between -3.8 and -6.8. These estimates are consid-
erably higher than the LWC-6 estimates in Table 2, which are between -3.2
and -4.8. Our preferred specication of column 1 yields a price eect of -5.1.9
To control for valuation eects through the exchange rate on producer
prices, we also show estimates for Chinese import volume measured in kilo-
gram. For completeness, OLS and IV estimates are shown in Table 5. Jump-
ing to the IV regressions of Panel B, the estimates show that the "China
eect" on European prices lies between -1.9 to -2.7. These highly signicant
coecient estimates for Chinese imports have a stronger eect on European
prices than do the estimates using LWC-6. The dierence is in the order of
0.5 percentage points. This result is not surprising given the fact that half of
the total LWC-10 import share stems from China, and that Chinese goods
are probably the cheapest of all imports.
4.2 Bilateral estimates for individual European countries
Until now, Europe is treated as a single regional block. Next, we ask whether
9Auer and Fischer (2010) show that the same eect for the United States is only 2.5%
using data at the 6-digit NAICS level. However, it should be noted that direct comparisons
are dicult, because dierent concordance assumptions are used in the NAICS and NACE
classications.
22LWC exports impact producer prices dierently across European countries.
A priori, we do not expect LWC import competition to be homogeneous
across countries or regions. Dierences in market size, trade linkages, and
general openness to trade expose countries to dierent levels of LWC import
competition.
Table 6 records the regression estimates of LWC import competition on
Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Panel B displays
the second-stage relation between changes in import values in columns 1 to
5 and import volumes in columns 6 to 10. Panel A presents the equivalent
information from the rst-stage regression. The regressions are similar in
specication to those presented in column 1 of Tables 2 and 3. The regressors
are LWC-6 import share and time dummies.
The regression results show that LWC import competition is wide-spread,
yet the size of the impact varies between European countries. There is strong
evidence of LWC import competition in Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The coecient estimates for import share are signicant for all
countries except for Italy in the regressions using import values (columns 1 to
5) and are signicant for Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in the
regressions using import volume. Further, the coecient estimates for import
23values and import volumes show that the LWC penetration eect for prices
is strongest for the United Kingdom and Sweden, followed by Germany and
France. When LWC exporters capture 1% of British market share, producer
prices decrease by -3.8% in the regression using import volumes. In the same
regression for Sweden the price eect is -2.6%, whereas for Germany it is
only -1.2%.
In contrast, the estimates for Italy suer in that neither of the rst-stage
estimates are signicant. Further, it should be noted that the low degrees
of freedom and data quality may partially explain the poor performance
for Italy. This nding is also in accordance with Bugamelli et al. (2010).
They nd a signicant (since they are using micro data at the establishment
level) but only small eect of Chinese import competition on Italian prices
when using an instrumentation strategy combining elements of Bernard et
al. (2006) and Auer and Fischer (2010).
4.3 Central and Eastern Europe's impact on European prices
What is the impact of the increasing integration between our ve import
markets and CEE on European producer prices? The fall of the Berlin Wall
unleashed a large pool of low-wage workers that quickly converged to Euro-
pean standards. Our denition of a low-wage country assumes a high share
24of manufactured exports and a nation's average GDP per capita is less than
25% of the average GDP per capita for Italy, Germany, France, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. This LWC denition includes Poland, Romania, Slo-
vakia, and Turkey. The results in the previous sections show a strong impact
from LWCs primarily from Asia. Does CEE import competition also inu-
ence European prices?
The empirical evidence for CEE import competition is limited at best. A
rst hurdle lies with the low power of the instrument when applied to this
group of countries: labor intensity alone cannot explain marginal exports to
Europe. Table 7 shows rst-stage regressions using import volume for the
four low-wage CEE countries plus Russia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
All estimations include xed eects by sector and year dummies. Although
Russia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary do not fulll our LWC denition,
they are used as controls. The regressions in Panel B thus use the same in-
strument of Tables 2 to 6 that multiplies European labor intensity by Eastern
European manufacturing.10
To rene the instrumentation strategy, equation 6 is used instead. The
instrument proposed in equation 3 is weighted by the lagged import share
10The instrument of Auer and Fischer (2010) is not signicant for the CEE countries.
25of the CEE exporters in each European importer, i.e., the adjusted instru-
ment corrects for the small market share of low-wage CEE countries. Panel
A of Table 7 displays the rst-stage relation between changes of import vol-
umes from the individual CEE countries and the CEE countries' sectoral
weight multiplied by the change in the CEE countries' manufacturing out-
put.11 The adjusted instrument is signicant for three of the four low-wage
CEE countries, while three non low-wage CEE countries that act as controls
are insignicant.
The next step in the IV analysis shows only limited evidence of low-wage
CEE import competition for European producer prices. The single country
eect is smaller than the estimates found in Tables 2 to 6 and is signicant
only for a single country. Table 8 presents IV regressions only for the three
low-wage CEE countries (Romania, Poland, and Turkey) that passed the
rst-stage hurdle using our adjusted instrument in Panel A of Table 7. The
regressions show only a signicant result for Romania. When Romanian
exporters capture 1% of European market share, producer prices decrease
11The changes of import volumes are dened as the year-on-year absolute change in
(LWC import volume/European industry size), where the industry size is dened as the
1995-2008 average value of European domestic production plus world imports.
26about 1.0%. In contrast, no such eect is present for Poland and Turkey.
Several factors could explain the non import competition result for low-
wage CEE countries versus the strong results for LWC-6. A rst issue is that
our low-wage CEE countries are only borderline low-wage. If we alter our
denition from 25% to 20% of European per capita GDP, Poland and Slovakia
fall out. As expected, Romania, the only "true" low-wage country is also the
only signicant eect. A related issue is that the CEE labor market does
not match the Chinese labor pool in size. China possesses a vast reservoir of
labor that mitigates wage growth in the dynamic coastal regions. Instead,
CEE wages and productivity have risen rapidly, converging to European
levels. Further, Auer and Fischer (2008) show that Chinese output in low-
skilled products is wide ranging. In contrast, CEE manufacturing tends to
be sector specic and thus does not have the same breadth as Chinese goods
to impact European producer prices.
5. Decomposing the LWC price eect
The evidence in sections 3 and 4 shows that there is a strong price response
to a supply-induced increase of LWC import competition. In this section,
the analysis considers the channels through which this is achieved. First,
27the role of wages and employment is examined. The analysis then considers
how import competition reduces rms' markups and increases rms' produc-
tivity.12 The results show that LWC import competition has a profound on
European industry through the rm-reshuing channel of Melitz (2003).
5.1 Import competition's eect on European labor
The regressions with information from the European labor market are pre-
sented in Table 9. Columns 1 to 4 focus on the wage eect of increasing
import competition. In column 1, the dependent variable is the year-to-year
percentage change in the average cost of a production worker per hour.13
The baseline panel estimation includes year and xed eects. Although the
coecient for import share is -4.12, it is statistically insignicant. A poten-
tial explanation for this insignicance is that wages react slowly to import
competition. If so, this means that the yearly panel analysis fails to pick up
the long-run trends caused by LWC import competition. The analysis there-
fore considers next the long-run response of wages (and other dependent
12The source is Eurostat's Structural Business Statistics and the sample is from 1995 to
2007.
13This cost measure reects the rm's point of view. It is the same whether labor costs
decrease due to a reduction in wages or through a reduction of benets and social security
contributions.
28variables) to supply-growth induced LWC import competition.
The dependent variable is now the total percentage change in the average
hourly cost of work by a production worker during the entire sample. The in-
dependent variable is the (instrumented) change in LWC import competition
over the same period. The estimated model is thus
X
t95 07




In the rst-stage estimation (not reported), the long run change in LWC im-
port competition
P
t95 07 mlwc;j;t is then instrumented with the cumulated
growth of LWC-6 industrial supply interacted with the sector's European
labor intensity.
The analysis of column 2 relates the long-run changes in import competi-
tion to the long-run change in the average hourly cost of work by a production
worker. The regression shows that a change in import competition is associ-
ated with a statistically signicant but economically only moderate eect on
wages. A 1% increase in LWC imports in European market share results in
a decrease by 0.572% percent in labor costs.
Two alternative specications document the robustness of the wage eect.
Column 3 evaluates the eect of LWC-10 import competition. The regression
shows a slightly smaller but still comparable point estimate of  0:433. Col-
29umn 4 instruments for the increase in LWC-6 import share in physical units
rather than in euros. Again, the point estimate is statistically signicant but
small in magnitude ( 0:461).
The regressions in columns 2 to 4 show that LWC imports have only a
small impact on relative wages in Europe. Because the average total increase
in LWC import competition was around four percentage points in the ve
European markets, this suggests that LWC import competition has reduced
European wages by only 2:3% in the 12-year sample.
This moderate nding regarding relative wages has to be interpreted with
care, however: it does not imply that low-skilled workers do not suer from
import competition. The absence of any industry-specic eect could also be
the consequence of workers being exible across industries and, therefore, dif-
ferences between sectors being non-responsive to import competition. What
could never the less be the case is that LWC imports have a strong employ-
ment eect, that decreased the overall (and not the relative) wage in the
European manufacturing sector.
Next, Table 9 presents evidence on the question whether LWC import
competition decreases the number of employed workers in a sector. Columns
5 to 7 relate the long-run change in the supply growth induced import com-
30petition to the long-run percentage change in production workers employed
in a sector. Following the specications in columns 2 to 4, we rst instrument
for the long-run change in LWC-6 import competition (column 5), the long-
run change in LWC-10 import competition (column 6), and for the change
of LWC-6 import competition measured in physical quantity (column 7).
For all specications, there is a substantial employment eect. For exam-
ple, the point estimate from column 5 says a 1% increase in LWC-6 import
competition is associated with a 2:5% reduction in employment. During
1995 to 2007 the average cumulated increase in LWC import competition
was around four percentage points. This implies that during the 12-year
sample, LWC import competition has reduced employment in the manufac-
turing sector by around 10%. This result is substantial. It says in relation to
the sectors we cover in ve European markets that employ roughly 13 million
workers in 2007, LWC import competition has reduced the workforce by 1:3
million.
In addition to reducing the number of employed, LWC import competition
could also inuence the number of hours worked per worker. Column 8
reproduces the specication of column 5 but uses the percentage change in
the number of total hours worked in the sector as dependent variable. The
31signicant coecient is  2:64, which is similar to the estimate in column 5.
This result suggests that the average numbers of hours worked per employed
workers is unaected by import competition. It seems that rms tend to re
workers rather than reduce the number of hours per worker.
The above regressions only include workers with traditional employment
contracts and do not consider payments to workers hired through agencies.
It is likely that rms facing increased import competition rely on temporary
workers hired by outside agencies more often than do rms that do not face
import competition. In column 9, the dependent variable is the long-run
percentage change in the expenses for \Payment for Agency Work". Indeed,
the point estimate of 8.508 suggests that hiring agency workers is a major
source of cutting costs for rms facing high import competition.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the aggregate, the size of the agency
workforce is small. In 2007, total payments to agency workers was less than
euro 20 billion (in the ve European countries), compared to a total wage bill
of euro 520 billion for workers employed with traditional contracts. Although
LWC import competition may well have caused a boom for worker agencies,
it is unlikely to have created employment gains big enough to oset the direct
loss of jobs with traditional employment contracts.
325.2 The role of margins and productivity
The regressions in Table 9 highlight the observation that increasing LWC
import competition has reduced employment in European manufacturing.
These regressions also show that the eect of LWC import competition on
relative wages across manufacturing sectors is rather limited. As a next step
in decomposing the relative price eect for European industry, the role of
margins and productivity is examined.
A good's price can be expressed as the per unit cost of the good mul-
tiplied by (1 + markup). Hence, abstracting from aggregation issues, the
percentage change of the average sectoral price can be decomposed into the
contribution of (always in percent) cost of input changes that includes wages
(cj;t), changes in productivity (aj;t), and changes in one plus the markup
((1 + j;t)),
pj;t = cj;t   aj;t + (1 + j;t):
This decomposition reects the three main channels through which LWC
import competition can aect prices in the developed world. The classical
theory of trade predicts that labor intensive imports will decrease the wage
of unskilled workers and thus also the price of labor intensive goods produced
in Europe. The literature deriving from Melitz (2003), in contrast, argues
33that import competition has important eects on average productivity via the
crowding out of unproductive rms. A third potential channel is that markup
decrease following increased import competition (see Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008)).
As a rst step, we examine whether a rm's markups and prots decrease
with growing import competition. To test this, average rm margins in a
sector are dened as 1 minus the share of variable costs, vcj;t, to revenue,
rj;t:
1+j;t=(rj;t - vcj;t)/rj;t,
where variable costs are equal to total labor expenses, payments to agency
workers, and the total costs of materials and supplies.
The evidence in columns 1 to 3 of Table 10 shows that margins do not
respond to LWC import competition. Following the previous econometric
framework in Table 9, we rst instrument for the long-run change in LWC-6
import competition (column 1), the long-run change in LWC-10 import com-
petition (column 2), and the change of LWC-6 import competition measured
in physical quantity (column 3). The change in import value is insignicant
in each of these specications. The fact that the estimated coecients are
positive signed lends further evidence against the role of margins.
34Productivity is the next channel considered. The regressions with pro-
ductivity are in columns 4 to 6. The dependent variable is the long-run
percentage change in the \Apparent Labor Productivity", which is equal to
the value added divided by the number of employed. In column 4, where
we instrument for the long-run change in LWC-6 import competition, a one
percentage point increase in imports is associated with an increase in sec-
toral productivity of 2.569%. This estimate is in line with the two alterna-
tive specications instrumenting for the long-run change in LWC-10 import
competition (column 5) and for the change of LWC-6 import competition
measured in physical quantity (column 6).
The analysis for European industry unveils that the eect of LWC import
competition on European prices can be explained by a moderate wage and
a strong productivity eect. More specically, in our baseline estimation in
column 1 of Table 2, prices decrease by 3.531% following a 1% increase in
LWC market share. The results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that this price
decrease is explained by a 0.572% decrease in wages (column 2 of Table 9)
and a 2.569% increase in labor productivity (column 4 in Table 10).
What explains the strong productivity response? Starting with Melitz
(2003), the trade literature has increasingly focused on within-industry dy-
35namics as a source of aggregate productivity growth. If import competition
forces unproductive rms to leave the market, average productivity increases.
While we do not have data on single rms, our dataset has information on
the number of European rms in each sector.
A next step thus tests whether import competition leads to a change
in the number of domestic rm exits for a particular sector. In column 7,
the dependent variable is the long-run percentage change in the number of
European rms active in each sector. This specication instruments for the
long-run change in LWCs. The IV estimation shows that a 1% increase in
LWC market share decreases the number of active European rms by 2.447%.
How does import competition aect the size composition of European indus-
try? The regression in column 8 now denes the dependent variable as the
long-run percentage change in employment per rm. This regression shows
that average rms size is unaected by import competition, as is predicted
by the Melitz model.14
14LWC import competition could also result in productivity growth due to the within-
rm concentration on \core" products (see Mayer et al. (2010) and Bernard et al. (forth-
coming). However, given that we nd that the sales per rm remain rather constant, our
results indicate that in the studied sample, the product reshuing channel is not of rst
order importance for aggregate productivity growth.
36The regressions in Tables 9 and 10 show that increasing LWC import
competition reduced European aggregate demand of domestically produced
goods. This response is reected in the reduced number of available jobs,
in the increased number of exits of unproductive rms, and in the resulting
aggregate productivity growth.15
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates how imports from LWCs inuence European pro-
ducer prices. The results show that the IV strategy of Auer and Fischer
(2010) has far reaching applications beyond the U.S. case. This IV strat-
egy relies on the observation that when LWCs grow, their exports increase
much more in labor intensive sectors than in capital intensive sectors. We
therefore instrument for trade ows using the interaction between growth of
LWC manufacturing output and sectoral labor share. To lter out aggre-
gate correlations and sector specic trends, we use a dierence-in-dierence
specication that exploits only how sectoral dierences in trade ows aect
15It is also noteworthy that both the qualitative ndings and the uncovered magnitudes
in Auer and Fischer (2008) are similar for the response of U.S. industry to LWC import
competition.
37sectoral dierences in price changes above trend. Although aggregate growth
may be endogenous to global demand, the dierence in how various sectors
are aected by growth can be exploited to identify the causal eects of trade.
In a panel covering 110 (4-digit) NACE industries from 1995 to 2008, the
results show that trade with LWCs has a strong impact on European pro-
ducer prices and on industrial productivity. More specically, the ndings
document that the traditional LWCs such as China generate a larger price
impact than the newly integrating EU countries such as Poland and Romania
that also satisfy our denition of low-wage country. When exporters from
traditional LWCs capture 1% of European market share, producer prices de-
crease about 2%. In contrast, no such eect is present for import competition
from CEE countries.
To understand how import competition inuences European industry, the
LWC price eect is decomposed between wages, margins and productivity.
The regressions show that import competition has a pronounced eect on
average productivity with only a muted eect on wages or margins. Owing
to the exit of rms and the increase in productivity, LWC import compe-
tition is shown to have substantially reduced employment in the European
manufacturing sector.
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41Appendix: Selection Criteria for LWCs and Data Sources
Selection criteria for low wage countries
We dene a country to be low wage if a nation's average GDP per capita
(averages from 1995-2008) is less than 25% of the average GDP per capita
(in current US dollars) for Italy, Germany, France, Sweden and the United
Kingdom (average GDP for the ve countries between 1995 to 2008). There
are 137 countries with a per capita GDP of less than 25% of average Euro-
pean GDP per capita. However, there are many countries among them that
account for only a small fraction of total European imports. We drop all
countries whose exports account for less than 5% of European imports. This
leaves us with 24 economies.
We next account only for countries in which the share of manufactured ex-
ports (in percent of total merchandizing exports) is higher than 70%. The last
criterion leaves us with 10 economies, which are China, India, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Thailand, and Turkey.
These countries account for 12.4% of total mean imports of Italy, France,
Germany, Sweden and United Kingdom. China contributes most to this
share. In 2008, almost 50% of this LWC import share is accounted for by
China. Poland with 18% and Turkey with about 9% are the second and
third largest contributors. All other countries account for around 5% or less
of total LWC imports.
In the analysis, we rst focus on the following six countries China, India,
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand, and dene them as (tradi-
tional) LWC. Separately, we consider the impact of CEE countries: Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
How would altering the sample criterion aect our sample? Changing the
cut-o of a low-wage country to 20% of US GDP per capita excludes Mexico,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Altering the share of manufactured exports
in total merchandizing exports to 75% would exclude India with a share of
72.9%. Lowering the threshold to 65% would include Ukraine. By lowering
the threshold to 50%, we would include Brazil and South Africa. Finally, by
lowering the export threshold value of 5% of European imports to only 1%




Data on external (bilateral) trade are from Eurostat. Detailed 8-digit
product level data (classied in CN8) are available from 1988 to 2008 for
various European countries and country groups.16 The analysis is restricted
to imports from the following partner countries: Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
16These countries are France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Ire-
land, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Belg.-
42India, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, China, Japan,
Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland,
Czech Republic, and Belarus. Eurostat's external trade statistics provides
information about the import value (measured in 1000 ECUs), and import
volume (measured in tons).
To match the external trade data with the other data sources classied at
the NACE economic activity level, it is necessary to convert the product-level
data to the NACE classication. For this exercise, the ad-hoc conversion
tables created by Eurostat Unit G3 "International trade-Production" are
used.17 This concordance table allows a conversion from CN8 to CPA (4-
digit statistical classication of products by activity).18 The correspondences
are created from a multiple (CN) to a single (CPA classication) basis. The
product-level data by CPA are summed to construct an aggregate measure
for the import value and volume by CPA/NACE.
To construct the instrument, sectoral values of world imports and the
sectoral domestic production are needed. These are then averaged over the
sample period. The sectoral domestic production and aggregate import val-
ues are taken from the PRODCOM database of Eurostat. PRODCOM is an
8-digit product-level classication of industrial production data. The rst
4 digits correspond to the NACE (Rev. 1.1) classication. For the import
and production values, the corresponding NACE-level measure can be ob-
tained by simply aggregating the values over the dierent products within
each NACE class. For the corresponding quantities, the aggregation is not
straightforward: As dierent products within one NACE-class are measured
in dierent units (such as kg, liters, pieces etc.). In a rst step all units are
converted into kg to match the trade data (which is classied in 1000kg). To
convert all units to kg, the mean value per kg within each NACE-class are
used to approximate the quantities of those products which are not in kg. In
cases where no product per NACE class is classied in kg, they are treated
as missing values.
b) Price data
The price data are from Eurostat. The industry producer price index for
the domestic market are used. These data are classied as NACE Rev. 2
and range from 1975 to 2008. However, for most of the countries, data is
available only from 1990 or even later, especially at the most detailed 4-digit
level. Furthermore, 4-digit level is not available for all divisions or groups.
Luxembourg, Austria, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia Cyprus, the EU, EU15 and EU25.
17See http : ==ec:europa:eu=eurostat=ramon=otherdocuments=index:cfm?TargetUrl =
DSPOTHERDOCDTL
18The CPA classication corresponds to the NACE Rev. 1.1 classication.
43The NACE Rev. 2 data has to be converted into NACE Rev. 1.1 to
match it with the other data. For this, the correspondences provided by
Eurostat are used. For those classes without a unique correspondence, the
classes are chosen which matched best among the competing classes. For
example, the class DK29.13 (Manufacture of taps and valves) in NACE Rev.
1.1 corresponds to both, the class C28.14 (Manufacture of other taps and
valves) and C33.12 (Repair of machinery). As C28.14 corresponds better to
the target code, C28.14 is used as the source code.
c) Other variables
To construct labor intensity, data from the structural business statistics
(sbs), downloadable from Eurostat, are used. The structural business statis-
tics comprise information such as dierent measures of value added, turnover,
the number of employees, number of hours, R&D expenditure, labor produc-
tivity, personnel costs, gross investment in tangible goods (such as buildings
and structures, land, machinery and equipment), or energy expenditures.
These variables are disaggregated at 4-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 for 1995 to 2007
and at 2- or 3-digit level for 1985 to 1995.
Sectoral labor intensity is constructed as the average (over time and coun-
tries) of personnel costs divided by the average gross investment in tangibles,
which serves as a proxy for capital expenditures.
Finally, data on manufacturing growth in the LWC countries are obtained
from Datastream [CN, IN, MY, TH, JP, VN], IFS [PH, MX] or the OECD
Main Economic Indicators [CA, BR, ID, CN].


























































Notes: Europe is France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. LWC imports are from China,  
India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand. Data source are Eurostat (4-digit) 110 NACE industries  
from 1995- 2008  
 
45Figure 2: Labor intensive sectors and LWC import share 
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Notes: Europe is France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. LWC  
imports are from China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand. Data  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification with year incl. LWC  incl. LWC  Eurozone  Lagged Prices Lagged Ch.
dummies Manfct. Growth Manfct. Growth /  countries Imports LWC
Productivity & Wages FR, IT, DE
Ch. Imports LWC -0.056* 0.001 0.015 -0.029 -0.040 -0.054
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.023] [0.030] [0.026] [0.032] [0.025] [0.026]






Lag of Producer Prices     0.104**
[0.031]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC -0.067
[0.063]
Within R-Square 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.10
Ch. Imports LWC      -3.531***     -3.575***     -4.883***      -3.167***      -3.623*** -3.568***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.964] [0.805] [1.095] [1.030] [0.881] [0.996]
Ch. % LWC Manufacturing      0.342*** 0.433***
Output [0.069] [0.092]
Productivity      0.000***
[0.000]
Wages   -0.000**
[0.000]
Lag of Producer Prices      0.102***
[0.029]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC -0.395***
[0.084]
Labor Intensity * Ch. % LWC      0.010**    0.009**    0.008**  0.009*    0.010** 0.010**
Manfct. Output [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]






Lag of Producer Prices 0.000
[0.003]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC -0.093**
[0.023]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 18.991 17.392 10.704 12.232 17.949 19.440
Max Reject Stock-Yogo Crit Value 10% 10% 15% 15% 10% 10%
Level    
1
st stage F-statistic 16.55 19.09 12.67 9.38 15.32 18.19
Year dummies (both stages) y n n y y y
Observations 7010 7010 5620 4757 6613 6386
Groups (Destination - NACE) 618 618 612 436 618 618
R-Square (first stage within) 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
Table 2 - LWC Import Value (in €)  and European
1 Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Panel B: IV Second Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Panel A: IV First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (LWC Import Value in € / European
1 Industry Size)
Panel C: OLS - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Notes: 1Europe is France,Germany,Italy,United Kingdom,and Sweden.PanelC of Table 2 showsthe OLS relation between changesof import valuesin €
from six LWCs and European producer prices. Panel B displays two-stage least squares estimations. The dependent variable is the annual change in the
logarithm of the producer price at the four-digit NACE (Rev. 1.1) level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute
change in (LWC import value in €/European industry size). The industry size is defined as the 1995-2008 average value of European domestic production
plus world imports. In columns 2 and 3, "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the six
LWCs. Productivity is the wage adjusted labour productivity and wages capture wages and salaries. Column 4 captures only countries in the Eurozone, i.e.
France,Germanyand Italy.Column 5 includes lagged producerprice changesand column 6 incorporateslagged changesof LWC import values.In PanelA
the first-stage relation is displayed. The instrument is the sector’s labor intensity times “Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output". All estimations include fixed
effectsbysector.Clustered standarderrors(by country)reported in brackets;* significant at10%;** significant at5%; ***significant at1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification with year incl. LWC  incl. LWC  Eurozone  Lagged Prices Lagged Ch.
dummies Manfct. Growth Manfct. Growth /  countries Imports LWC
Productivity & Wages FR, IT, DE
Ch. Imports LWC -0.078* -0.097* -0.083** -0.079 -0.061 -0.076*
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.035] [0.043] [0.028] [0.063] [0.035] [0.029]






Lag of Producer Prices     0.073**
[0.025]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC  -0.038**
[0.009]
Within R-Square 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.13
Ch. Imports LWC     -1.992***     -1.922***      -2.326***     -1.513***     -2.191***     -1.987***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.638] [0.534] [0.746] [0.561] [0.633] [0.662]
Ch. % LWC Manufacturing      0.307***     0.348***
Output [0.051] [0.057]
Productivity    0.000**
[0.000]
Wages    0.000**
[0.000]
Lag of Producer Prices      0.074***
[0.023]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC     -0.254***
[0.073]
Labor Intensity * Ch. % LWC         0.020***      0.021***    0.021**   0.021*      0.020***     0.022***
Manfct. Output [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004]






Lag of Producer Prices 0.001
[0.003]
Lag of Ch. Imports LWC    -0.114***
[0.007]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 44.089 44.180 38.093 34.506 40.705 48.839
Max Reject Stock-Yogo Crit Value 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Level    
1
st stage F-statistic 26.32 25.12 15.87 9.057 23.06 26.91
Year dummies (both stages) y n n y y y
Observations 4908 4908 3935 3329 4633 4468
Groups (Destination - NACE) 434 434 429 305 434 434
R-Square (first stage within) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10
Panel A: IV First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (LWC Import Volume in kilograms/ European
1 Industry Size)
Table 3 - LWC Import Volume (in kilograms) and European
1 Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Panel C: OLS - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Panel B: IV Second Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Notes: 1Europe is France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Sweden. Panel C of Table 3 shows the OLS relation between changes of import
volume (in kilograms)from six LWCs and European producerprices. PanelB displaystwo-stage least squaresestimations.The dependent variable
is the annual change in the logarithm of the producer price at the four-digit NACE (Rev. 1.1) level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports
LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC import volume in kg/European industry size). The industry size is defined as the 1995-2008
average value of European domestic production plus world imports. In columns 2 and 3, "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted
average growth rate of manufacturing output in the six LWCs. Productivity is the wage adjusted labour productivity and wages capture wages and
salaries. Column 4 captures only countries in the Eurozone, i.e. France, Germany and Italy. Column 5 includes lagged producer price changes and
column 6 incorporateslagged changesof LWC import volumes. In Panel Athe first-stage relation is displayed.The instrument is the sector’s labor
intensity times “Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output". All estimations include fixed effects by sector. Clustered standard errors (by country) reported
in brackets;*significant at10%;** significant at5%;*** significant at1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification with year incl. China incl. China Eurozone  Lagged Prices Lagged Ch.
dummies Ind. Growth Ind. Growth /  countries Imports LWC
Productivity & Wages FR, IT, DE
Ch. Imports China     -0.092***  -0.032*   -0.016**     -0.085***     -0.073***     -0.078***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.019] [0.016] [0.007] [0.026] [0.014] [0.015]






Lag of Producer Prices    0.104**
[0.031]
Lag of Ch. Imports China -0.062
[0.078]
Within R-Square 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.10
Ch. Imports China -5.101***     -4.840***     -6.728***     -3.864***     -5.039***     -5.304***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [1.487] [1.355] [2.283] [0.869] [1.328] [1.635]
Ch. % China Manufacturing      0.401***       0.512***
Output [0.098] [0.155]
Productivity      0.000***
[0.000]
Wages   -0.000**
[0.000]
Lag of Producer Prices      0.104***
[0.026]
Lag of Ch. Imports China -0.237
 [0.210]
Labor Intensity * Ch. % China       0.007***      0.007***      0.006***     0.007***      0.007***     0.008***
Manfct. Output [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]






Lag of Producer Prices 0.001
[0.002]
Lag of Ch. Imports China -0.034
[0.041]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 12.146 12.428 7.767 10.488 11.555 12.534
Max Reject Stock-Yogo Crit Value 15% 15% 20% 15% 15% 15%
Level    
1
st stage F-statistic 16.22 18.45 10.61 14.2 16.16 15.63
Y e a r  d u m m i e s  ( b o t h  s t a g e s ) y nnyyy
Observations 7273 7273 5803 4943 6613 6678
Groups (Destination - NACE) 618 618 611 436 618 618
R-Square (first stage within) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
Panel B: IV Second Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Panel A: IV First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (China Import Value in €  / European
1 industry Size)
Table 4 - China  Import Value (in €)   and European
1 Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Panel C: OLS - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Notes: 1Europe is France,Germany,Italy,United Kingdom,and Sweden.PanelC of Table 4 showsthe OLS relation between changesof import valuesin €
from China and European producer prices. Panel B displays two-stage least squares estimations. The dependent variable is the annual change in the
logarithm of the producer price at the four-digit NACE (Rev. 1.1) level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports China" is defined as the y/y absolute
change in (China import value in €/European industry size). The industry size is defined as the 1995-2008 average value of European domestic production
plusworld imports.In columns 2 and 3,"Ch.% China ManufacturingOutput"is the growth rate of manufacturingoutput in China.Productivity isthe wage
adjusted labour productivity and wages capture wages and salaries. Column 4 captures only countries in the Eurozone, i.e. France, Germany and Italy.
Column 5 includes lagged producerprice changesand column 6 incorporateslagged changesof Chinese import values. In PanelA the first-stage relation is
displayed. The instrument is the sector’s labor intensity times “Ch. % China Manufacturing Output". All estimations include fixed effects by sector.
Clusteredstandarderrors(by country)reported in brackets;* significant at10%;** significant at5%; ***significant at1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification with year incl. China incl. China Eurozone  Lagged Prices Lagged Ch.
dummies Ind. Growth Ind. Growth /  countries Imports LWC
Productivity & Wages FR, IT, DE
Ch. Imports China     -0.110***    -0.129***    -0.125*** -0.108   -0.083**    -0.103***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.039] [0.042] [0.023] [0.071] [0.037] [0.032]






Lag of Producer Prices       0.073***
[0.025]
Lag of Ch. Imports China -0.050
  [0.024]
Within R-Square 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.12
Ch. Imports China     -2.291***    -2.200***    -2.673***     -1.913***     -2.374***    -2.410***
(in % of European Industry Size)  [0.493] [0.431] [0.639] [0.497] [0.433] [0.566]
Ch. % China Manufacturing     0.353***     0.400***
Output [0.055] [0.064]




Lag of Producer Prices     0.070***
[0.019]
Lag of Ch. Imports China     -0.273***
[0.048]
Labor Intensity * Ch. % China      0.020***     0.020***      0.020***      0.018***      0.020***      0.021***
Manfct. Output [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]






Lag of Producer Prices 0.000
[0.002]
Lag of Ch. Imports China     -0.097***
[0.006]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 49.408 48.065 42.4 33.238 46.957 52.855
Max Reject Stock-Yogo Crit Value 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Level    
1
st stage F-statistic 44.63 43.67 30.41 15.62 53.38 49.96
Year dummies (both stages) y n n y y y
Observations 5104 5104 4072 3465 4637 4682
Groups (Destination - NACE) 434 434 429 305 434 434
R-Square (first stage within) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.08
Table 5 - China Import Volume (in kilograms)  and European Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Panel C: OLS - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Panel B: IV Second Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change in Producer Prices
Panel A: IV First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (China Import Volume in kilograms  / European
1 industry Size)
Notes: Europe is France,Germany,Italy,United Kingdom,and Sweden.PanelC of Table 5 shows the OLS relation between changesof import volume (in
kilograms)from China and European producerprices. PanelB displaystwo-stage least squaresestimations.The dependent variable isthe annualchange in
the logarithm of the producer price at the four-digit NACE (Rev. 1.1) level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports China" is defined as the y/y
absolute change in (China import volume in kg/European industry size). The industry size is defined asthe 1995-2008 average value of European domestic
production plus world imports. In columns 2 and 3, "Ch. % China Manufacturing Output" is the growth rate of manufacturing output in China.
Productivity is the wage adjusted labourproductivityand wagescapture wagesand salaries.Column 4 capturesonly countriesin the Eurozone, i.e. France,
Germany and Italy. Column 5 includes lagged producer price changes and column 6 incorporates lagged changes of Chinese import volumes. In Panel A
the first-stage relation isdisplayed.The instrument isthe sector’s laborintensity times“Ch.% China Manufacturing Output".Allestimationsinclude fixed
effectsbysector.Clustered standarderrors(by country)reported in brackets;* significant at10%;** significant at5%; ***significant at1%.
51 
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
1
0
)
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
S
w
e
d
e
n
I
t
a
l
y
U
K
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
S
w
e
d
e
n
I
t
a
l
y
U
K
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
L
W
C
 
-
2
.
3
0
6
*
*
 
-
2
.
6
6
9
*
 
-
3
.
2
8
5
*
*
4
3
.
7
3
5
-
7
.
8
0
5
*
 
-
1
.
1
5
5
*
-
0
.
8
8
9
-
2
.
5
9
5
*
-
1
2
.
7
1
4
 
 
-
3
.
7
9
4
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
'
s
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
1
.
0
4
1
]
[
1
.
5
1
9
]
[
1
.
6
7
3
]
[
2
7
1
.
8
5
4
]
[
4
.
7
0
6
]
 
[
0
.
6
6
3
]
[
0
.
5
8
9
]
[
1
.
3
8
0
]
[
2
3
.
8
8
4
]
[
1
.
4
8
7
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
L
W
C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
1
1
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
2
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
6
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
2
2
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
0
3
5
*
*
*
 
 
0
.
0
2
8
*
0
.
0
0
3
 
 
 
0
.
0
1
7
*
*
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
1
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
7
]
C
r
a
g
g
-
D
o
n
a
l
d
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
6
.
2
6
2
9
.
5
1
1
9
.
4
6
3
0
.
0
1
8
1
.
1
2
6
1
6
.
8
5
6
3
3
.
8
4
0
2
6
.
6
9
8
0
.
1
2
5
3
.
8
1
0
M
a
x
 
R
e
j
e
c
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
-
Y
o
g
o
 
C
r
i
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
2
5
%
1
5
%
1
5
%
>
 
2
5
%
>
 
2
5
%
1
0
%
1
0
%
1
0
%
>
 
2
5
%
>
 
2
5
%
L
e
v
e
l
 
 
 
1
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
1
.
6
3
9
.
3
2
3
7
.
4
2
9
0
.
0
2
6
2
.
9
2
9
1
1
.
0
5
9
.
9
3
3
1
1
.
6
9
0
.
2
8
2
8
.
6
9
7
Y
e
a
r
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
(
b
o
t
h
 
s
t
a
g
e
s
)
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
2
2
6
4
1
7
0
2
7
6
9
7
9
1
1
4
8
4
1
5
6
5
1
1
9
5
6
0
5
5
6
9
9
7
4
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
(
D
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
N
A
C
E
)
1
8
4
1
4
4
6
3
1
0
8
1
1
9
1
2
8
1
0
0
5
0
7
7
7
9
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
 
(
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
)
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
8
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
6
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
6
 
-
 
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
(
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
 
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
i
n
 
€
 
/
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
'
s
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
i
n
 
k
i
l
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
/
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
'
s
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
:
 
I
V
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
L
n
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
:
 
I
V
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
N
o
t
e
s
:
P
a
n
e
l
B
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
6
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
t
h
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
f
L
W
C
-
6
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
a
l
u
e
s
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
1
-
5
)
a
n
d
L
W
C
-
6
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
s
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
6
-
1
0
)
a
n
d
t
h
e
d
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
'
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
s
.
D
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
1
a
n
d
6
)
,
F
r
a
n
c
e
(
c
l
o
u
m
n
s
2
a
n
d
7
)
,
S
w
e
d
e
n
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
3
a
n
d
8
)
,
I
t
a
l
y
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
4
a
n
d
9
)
,
a
n
d
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
d
o
m
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
5
a
n
d
1
0
)
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
f
o
u
r
-
d
i
g
i
t
N
A
C
E
(
R
e
v
.
1
.
1
)
l
e
v
e
l
(
o
n
l
y
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
)
.
"
C
h
.
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
"
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
y
/
y
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
(
L
W
C
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
/
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
'
s
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
)
.
T
h
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
8
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
'
s
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
p
l
u
s
w
o
r
l
d
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
.
I
n
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
P
a
n
e
l
A
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
e
d
.
T
h
e
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
i
s
t
h
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
l
a
b
o
r
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
t
i
m
e
s
“
C
h
.
%
L
W
C
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
O
u
t
p
u
t
"
.
A
l
l
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
b
y
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
(
b
y
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
)
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
;
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
52 
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
R
u
s
s
i
a
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
P
o
l
a
n
d
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
T
u
r
k
e
y
P
a
n
e
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
F
E
,
 
w
/
o
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
R
u
s
s
i
a
'
s
 
 
-
0
.
0
0
0
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
'
s
-
0
.
0
0
7
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
'
s
 
0
.
0
0
1
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
'
s
0
.
0
0
3
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
'
s
0
.
0
0
1
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
0
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
'
s
0
.
0
0
0
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
T
u
r
k
i
s
h
0
.
0
0
1
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
0
1
]
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
 
(
w
i
t
h
i
n
)
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
0
1
2
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
7
R
u
s
s
i
a
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
R
u
s
s
i
a
'
s
 
 
0
.
4
6
0
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
5
9
1
]
C
z
e
c
h
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
C
z
e
c
h
 
-
0
.
3
7
5
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
'
s
 
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
8
7
6
]
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
'
s
 
0
.
6
6
0
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
4
4
1
]
P
o
l
a
n
d
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
'
s
 
 
 
 
 
1
.
5
9
4
*
*
*
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
0
8
7
]
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
'
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
6
0
2
*
*
*
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
1
0
4
]
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
'
s
0
.
1
7
0
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
3
2
1
]
T
u
r
k
e
y
'
s
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
*
 
C
h
.
 
%
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
'
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
8
4
4
*
*
*
M
a
n
f
c
t
.
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
[
0
.
1
6
7
]
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
5
0
8
5
5
1
4
1
5
1
3
6
5
1
5
6
5
0
5
7
5
0
6
1
5
1
3
4
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
(
D
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
N
A
C
E
)
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
R
-
S
q
u
a
r
e
 
 
(
w
i
t
h
i
n
)
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
1
2
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
1
0
9
0
.
0
1
7
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
4
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
7
 
-
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
o
f
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
,
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
i
n
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
(
P
a
n
e
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
:
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
(
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
'
s
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
i
n
 
k
i
l
o
g
r
a
m
s
/
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
1
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
:
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
(
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
'
s
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
i
n
 
k
i
l
o
g
r
a
m
s
/
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
1
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
N
o
t
e
s
:
1
E
u
r
o
p
e
i
s
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
I
t
a
l
y
,
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
,
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
7
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
f
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
s
e
v
e
n
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
n
d
l
a
b
o
r
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
t
i
m
e
s
“
C
h
.
%
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
'
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
O
u
t
p
u
t
"
.
P
a
n
e
l
A
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
7
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
f
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
s
e
v
e
n
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
'
s
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
w
e
i
g
h
t
t
i
m
e
s
"
C
h
.
%
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
'
s
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
O
u
t
p
u
t
"
.
T
h
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
f
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
s
a
r
e
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
y
/
y
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
(
L
W
C
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
/
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
)
.
T
h
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
8
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
p
l
u
s
w
o
r
l
d
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
.
A
l
l
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
b
y
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
(
b
y
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
)
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
;
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
53 
 
 
 
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
P
o
l
a
n
d
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
T
u
r
k
e
y
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
F
E
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
0
.
0
2
8
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
0
4
5
]
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
 
 
 
 
 
-
1
.
0
0
6
*
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
3
8
5
]
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
-
0
.
7
3
0
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
6
4
0
]
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
y
y
y
 
Y
e
a
r
 
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
y
y
y
 
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
5
1
5
6
5
0
5
7
5
1
3
4
 
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
 
(
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
)
0
.
1
1
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
(
D
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
N
A
C
E
)
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
 
1
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
3
3
5
.
3
3
3
.
2
7
2
5
.
5
6
 
 
 
I
V
 
2
n
d
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
L
n
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
T
a
b
l
e
 
8
 
-
 
L
o
w
-
W
a
g
e
 
C
E
E
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
N
o
t
e
s
:
T
a
b
l
e
8
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
a
n
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
s
f
r
o
m
s
e
l
e
c
t
l
o
w
-
w
a
g
e
C
E
E
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
T
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
a
r
e
P
o
l
a
n
d
,
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
,
T
u
r
k
e
y
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
f
o
u
r
-
d
i
g
i
t
N
A
C
E
(
R
e
v
.
1
.
1
)
l
e
v
e
l
(
o
n
l
y
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
)
.
"
C
h
.
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
"
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
y
/
y
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
'
s
i
m
p
o
r
t
v
o
l
u
m
e
i
n
k
g
/
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
.
T
h
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
i
z
e
i
s
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
8
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
p
l
u
s
w
o
r
l
d
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
.
T
h
e
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
u
s
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
i
s
t
h
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
w
e
i
g
h
t
t
i
m
e
s
“
C
h
.
%
C
e
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
'
s
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
O
u
t
p
u
t
"
.
A
l
l
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
a
n
d
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
b
y
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
(
b
y
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
)
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
;
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
54 
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
.
W
a
g
e
s
W
a
g
e
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
W
a
g
e
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
W
a
g
e
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
E
m
p
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
E
m
p
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
E
m
p
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
(
H
o
u
r
s
)
A
g
e
n
c
y
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
P
a
n
e
l
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
 
F
E
 
&
 
y
e
a
r
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
1
0
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
.
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
1
0
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
.
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
y
/
y
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
L
W
C
 
6
-
4
.
1
2
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
5
.
3
5
8
]
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
L
W
C
 
6
-
0
.
5
7
2
*
*
*
-
2
.
5
0
9
*
*
*
-
2
.
6
4
2
*
*
*
8
.
5
0
8
*
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
2
1
2
]
[
0
.
8
8
8
]
[
0
.
7
0
5
]
[
2
.
9
2
1
]
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
L
W
C
 
1
0
-
0
.
4
3
3
*
*
-
2
.
1
2
3
*
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
1
7
0
]
[
0
.
7
0
6
]
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
L
W
C
 
6
-
0
.
4
6
1
*
*
-
2
.
0
2
4
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
P
r
o
d
.
 
i
n
 
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
)
 
[
0
.
2
0
2
]
[
0
.
9
3
9
]
P
-
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
A
n
d
e
r
s
o
n
 
c
a
n
o
n
.
 
c
o
r
.
 
L
R
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
:
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
6
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
6
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
(
1
)
 
/
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
 
(
(
2
)
-
(
9
)
)
7
5
4
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
7
4
8
7
4
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
9
 
 
 
-
 
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
(
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
)
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
t
e
s
:
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
i
s
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
,
 
a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
.
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
9
 
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
‐
s
t
a
g
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
i
n
 
€
i
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
1
)
‐
(
3
)
,
 
(
5
)
,
 
(
6
)
,
 
(
8
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
(
9
)
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
(
(
4
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
7
)
)
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
0
 
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
(
3
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
6
)
)
 
o
r
 
6
 
(
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
)
 
L
W
C
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
1
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
a
g
e
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
(
2
)
 
t
o
 
(
4
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
a
g
e
.
 
I
n
 
(
5
)
 
t
o
 
(
7
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
I
n
 
(
8
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
w
o
r
k
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
.
 
I
n
 
(
9
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
g
e
n
c
y
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
;
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
55 
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
.
M
a
r
g
i
n
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
s
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
 
L
o
n
g
 
R
u
n
 
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
F
i
r
m
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
P
e
r
 
F
i
r
m
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
S
L
S
)
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
C
r
o
s
s
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
V
 
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
1
0
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
.
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
.
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
1
0
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
.
L
W
C
-
6
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
L
W
C
 
6
0
.
0
7
2
.
5
6
9
*
*
*
-
2
.
4
4
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
9
7
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
1
4
5
]
[
0
.
8
2
0
]
[
0
.
7
9
9
]
[
0
.
7
3
0
]
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
L
W
C
 
1
0
0
.
0
5
9
2
.
1
7
4
*
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
S
i
z
e
)
 
[
0
.
1
1
6
]
[
0
.
6
5
7
]
9
5
-
0
7
 
C
h
.
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
L
W
C
 
6
0
.
0
5
7
2
.
0
7
2
*
*
(
i
n
 
%
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
P
r
o
d
.
 
i
n
 
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
)
 
[
0
.
1
1
8
]
[
0
.
8
9
1
]
P
-
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
A
n
d
e
r
s
o
n
 
c
a
n
o
n
.
 
c
o
r
.
 
L
R
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
:
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
6
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
6
<
0
.
0
0
1
<
0
.
0
0
1
N
o
.
 
O
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
6
1
2
7
4
8
7
4
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
 
 
-
 
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
L
W
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
(
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
)
F
i
r
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
t
e
s
:
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
i
s
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
,
 
a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
.
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
0
 
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
‐
s
t
a
g
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
i
n
 
€
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
s
(
1
)
,
(
2
)
,
 
(
4
)
,
 
(
5
)
,
 
(
7
)
,
(
8
)
)
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
 
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
(
(
3
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
6
)
)
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
0
 
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
(
2
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
4
)
)
 
o
r
 
6
 
(
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
)
 
L
W
C
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
 
I
n
 
(
1
)
 
t
o
 
(
3
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
o
n
e
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
v
e
r
r
v
e
n
u
e
.
 
I
n
 
(
4
)
 
t
o
 
(
6
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
’
s
 
“
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
A
p
p
a
r
e
n
t
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
”
.
 
I
n
 
(
7
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
.
 
I
n
 
(
8
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
‐
0
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
;
 
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
;
 
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
;
 
*
*
*
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
.
 
56